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L Facts
A jury convicted Daryl Renard Atkins ("Atkins") of capital murder
under Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(4) and sentenced him to death for the
1996 abduction, robbery, and murder of Eric Nesbitt ("Nesbitt").1 The
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed Atkins's death sentence due to an error
in the verdict form and remanded for a new sentencing hearing.2 The
second jury also sentenced Atkins to death.3 The case then went to the
Supreme Court of Virginia for review of the second death sentence.'
II Holding
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Atkins's sentence of death and
rejected his assignments of error.5
1. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445, 447 (Va. 1999); see VA. CODE ANN. S
18.2-31(4) (Michie 2000) (defining as capital murder the willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing of any person in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery").
2. Atkins, 510 S.E.2d at 456-57 (remanding for re-sentencing because the verdict form
did not present option of life imprisonment upon finding that neither future dangerousness
or vileness was proven beyond a reasonable doubt). For a more complete discussion of the
facts of the case and the first decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia see Jason J. Solomon,
Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 401 (1999) (analyzing Atkins v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 445
(Va. 1999)).
The practitioner should note that the Supreme Court of Virginia remanded for re-
sentencing despite the fact that defense counsel did not object to the Commonwealth's
verdict form. Id. The court construed defense counsel's preference for his own verdict form
as an adequate objection to the Commonwealth's proffered verdict form. Id. at 456 n.8. The
court articulated an affirmative duty on the part of the trial court to ensure that the verdict
form properly states the law because it is "materially vital to the defendant in a criminal case
that the jury have a proper verdict form." Id. at 456.
Defense counsel may argue on appeal that an expressed preference for the jury instruc-
tions proffered by defense counsel to the trial court sufficiently preserves the challenge on
appeal. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Karcher, 229 S.E.2d 884, 885 (Va. 1976) (proffering of an
alternative jury instruction that properly states the law acts to preserve an objection to the
jury instruction that misstates the law).
3. Atkins v. Commonwealth, 534 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 2000).
4. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. S 17.1-313(C) (Michie 2000) (mandating review by the
Supreme Court of Virginia of all death sentences). Atkins pleaded guilty to abduction,
robbery, and the corresponding firearm charges prior to his capital murder trial. Atkins, 510
S.E.2d at 447 n.1.
5. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 314.
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III. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
Atkins assigned eight errors on appeal to the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia.6 The court's opinion broke the errors into the following four cate-.
gories: (1) mitigation issues; (2) jury issues; (3) motion to strike the
Commonwealth's evidence; and (4) proportionality review.7
A. Mitigation Issues
Atkins argued that Virginia's bifurcated jury system, which permitted
his re-sentencing before a different jury, unconstitutionally prevented him
from introducing relevant evidence from the guilt/innocence phase of the
trial.' Atkins argued that the Constitution permitted him to present evi-
dence of "residual doubt" to the re-sentencing jury.9 The Supreme Court of
Virginia and the United States Supreme Court previously rejected Atkins's
argument.'0 Atkins was not entitled to use evidence to raise "residual doubt"
as. mitigating evidence at sentencing." The court noted that in certain
instances the defendant may introduce mitigating evidence which was used
during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial as long as the evidence is not
used for purposes of "residual doubt." 2
6. Id. at 314-318. Atkins presented the following arguments: (1) Virginia's bifurcated
jury system is unconstitutional when a case is remanded to a new jury for sentencing; (2) the
circuit court erred in limiting examination of a witness; (3) the circuit court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury about mitigating factors; (4) the circuit court erred by denying his motion
to strike the venire because it was not representative of the demographics of the county; (5)
the Commonwealth's peremptory strike of a black juror violated the Equal Protection
Clause; (6) the circuit court erred because it failed to grant his motion to strike the evidence
for insufficiency to prove future dangerousness; (7) the circuit court erred because it failed
to grant his motion to strike the evidence for insufficiency to prove vileness; (8) his death
sentence was disproportionate to the penalties imposed for similar crimes. Id.
7. Id. This Case Note does not address the court's proportionality review.
8. Id. at 314.
9. Id. Residual doubt is the jury's consideration of aspects of the guilt/innocence
phase during the sentencing which raise questions regarding the defendant's conviction and
cause the jury to decide against the death penalty. See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226,247-48
(8th Cir. 1985) (Gibson, J. dissenting), revd sub nom; Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162
(1986) (holding that the Constitution does not prohibit removal of jurors for cause whose
Zposition to the death penalty would impair performance of duties at sentencing proceed-
10. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 314-15; see Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1988)
(holding that defendant has no constitutional right to present evidence at sentencing which
would question his identity as the murderer); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 402 S.E.2d 196,
206-07 (Va. 1991) (holding that defendant may not present evidence at sentencing regarding
his innocence).
11. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 315.
12. Id. at 315 n.4. But cf. Oken v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 259,267(4th Cit. 2000) (holding
that defendant's testimony used at the competency determination could be used against him
at sentencing without abridging defendant's right against self-incrimination). The court in
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Atkins attempted to introduce testimony from Investigator Lyons
("Lyons") that Atkins confessed to his involvement in the murder of
Nesbitt." Atkins argued that Lyons's testimony did not create "residual
doubt" about his guilt, but illustrated his remorse and cooperation with law
enforcement. 4 The Commonwealth objected because Lyons's testimony
would necessarily include Atkins's assertion that he was not the triggerman,
thus raising questions as to Atkins's guilt." The court affirmed the circuit
court's ruling that Lyons's statements were hearsay and not subject to any
exceptions. 16 However, if the court had admitted the evidence, the evidence




Atkins raised two issues regarding jury selection and composition.
Atkins first argued that the circuit court erred because it did not strike the
entire yenire. " Atkins asserted that the venire had three black members ahd
did not represent a fair cross-section of the community.19 The defendant
carries a heavy burden of showing a constitutional violation of the right to
a fair jury selection process, because the defendant must present evidence
that the Commonwealth engaged in a systematic exclusion of a "distinctive
Oken relied upon United States Supreme Court decisions that did not require an instruction
to a jury in a bifurcated trial to disregard the evidence presented during the guilt/innocence
phase when determining defendant's sentence. Oken, 220 F.3d at 267.
The practitioner may argue that a re-sentencing jury may consider evidence implicating
defendant's innocence by applying the Oken reasoning. The United States Supreme Court's
decision not to require an instruction that the jury should exclude from its sentencing
consideration evidence presented at the guilt/innocence phase could arguably be read as an
affirmative requirement that the sentencing jury ought to consider evidence presented at the
guilt/innocence portion of the trial.
Additionally, the court footnoted the fact that defense counsel failed to assign error to
the trial court's grant of the motion that restrained defense counsel from raising a factual
issue relating to Atkins's guilt at sentencing. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 314 n.3. To raise the
constitutional right to introduce residual doubt" evidence, the practitioner should object to
the grant of the motion that restrains defense counsel at sentencing and also assign the circuit
court's grant of the motion as error. See Matthew K Mahoney, Bridging the Procedural
Default Chasm, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 305 (2000) (discussing methods by which an attorney may
preserve claims from capital trial for appellate review).
13. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 315.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(B) (2000) (mandating that the evidence
presented at sentencing be subject to the rules of evidence).
17. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 315.
18. Id. at 316.
19. Id. at 316 (arguing that the county contained 30% black population and the venire
should reflect that same proportion).
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group of the community."20 Atkins failed to allege such a systematic exclu-
sion and failed to identify evidence in the record to support such an allega-
21tion.
Atkins also argued that the Commonwealth's peremptory strike of a
black juror violated Batson v. Kentucky.' The court may only reverse the
circuit court's finding of the absence of purposeful discrimination if the
finding was clearly erroneous.23 The Commonwealth proffered theljuror's
medical condition as the race-neutral reason for striking the juror. 4 The
circuit court's finding of the Commonwealth's proper race-neutral justifica-
tion was not clearly erroneous. 3
C. Motion to Strike the Commonwealth's Evidence
Atkins argued that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence
to support a finding of future dangerousness or vileness.2 The court dis-
agreed and found that Atkins's eighteen prior felony convictions including
robberies and a shooting sufficiently supported a finding of future danger-
ousness. 2  The court also concluded that the chief medical examiner's
testimony that none of the shots were immediately lethal supported the
jury's finding of vileness.28
20. Id. (quoting Chichester v. Commonwealth 448 S.E.2d 638, 647 (Va. 1994) (holding
that prosecutor's explanation that black jurors were struck because of possible bias against
the prosecution adequately rebutted presumption of purposeful discrimination)).
21. Id.
22. Id; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (holding that a peremptory strike
based on race violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
23. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 316; see Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 219, 223 (Va.
1995) (stating that the defendant who challenges a peremptory strike has the burden of
proving purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury panel (citing Buck v. Common-
wealth, 443 S.E.2d 414, 415 (Va. 1994))).
24. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at 316-17.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 317.
27. Id.
28. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(C) (Michie 2000) (defining vileness to be
torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery). The court relied upon the suffering of
the victim as the evidence sufficient to support a finding of vileness. Atkins, 534 S.E.2d at
317. Ironically, the court has also found that an execution-type murder supports a finding
of vileness, although the victim did not suffer. See Goins v. Commonwealth, 470 S.E.2d 114,
131 (Va. 1996) (finding evidence sufficient to support vileness because the slaying was
execution-style); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 427 S.E.2d 394, 409 (Va. 1993) (finding that the
evidence was sufficient to support vileness because of a deliberate execution-type murder"
of defendant's wife and child).
It is difficult to imagine a capital murder in which the victim will not either suffer or
die quickly. The court's construction of vileness reaches nearly every murderer, thus making
the finding of vileness almost a certainty. The practitioner may use the disparity of these
situations to raise a claim that Virginia's sentencing scheme is unconstitutionally vague under
[Vol. 13:2
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IV. Conclusion
Rules regarding mitigating evidence remain unsettled and creative
arguments ought to be used to introduce a diversity and volume of mitigat-
ing evidence. However, the circuit court may read the case law broadly to
exclude relevant evidence that casts the slightest shadow on the guilt of the
defendant.
Jeremy P. White
Godfrey v. Georgia. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427-28 (1980) (requiring a state's
capital sentencing scheme to give adequate guidance to a sentencing jury to provide a
meaningful basis for distinguishing between a murder deserving of the death penalty and
other murders).
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